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TITLE VII CLASS ACTIONS: THE "RECOVERY STAGE"
THoMAs H. BARNARD*
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 19641 and the class action2 have
developed contemporaneously, and neither would be quite what it
is today were it not for the other. When Title VII was enacted to
provide remedies for employment discrimination, the Equal Em-
ployment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) was not empowered to
grant relief, but only to seek it by the informal settlement procedure
of conciliation.3 After traversing this procedural obstacle course, the
aggrieved employee ultimately was left to file his own civil action
in federal district court.4
Because the EEO C was not authorized to grant initial relief in the
way that the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB), for example,
may issue cease and desist orders, the primary responsibility for
developing and legitimizing the Title VII theories of action and
forms of relief fell to the federal courts and the plaintiffs' lawyers.
Unquestionably, this development has been affected materially by
the availability of the class action under rule 23 of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure.' The 1966 amendment to rule 23 expanded the
class action's availability, giving fangs to a Title VII originally con-
sidered toothless.7
*B.A., University of Puget Sound; LL.B., Columbia University; LL.M., Case Western
Reserve University. Partner, Squire, Sanders & Dempsey, Cleveland, Ohio.
1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to e-15 (1970), as amended, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to e-17 (Supp. 11,
1972).
2. See FED. R. Cirv. P. 23.
3. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(a) (1970), as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (Supp. 11, 1972).
4. See id. § 20OOe-5(e), as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 200Oe-5(f) (Supp. 1I, 1972).
5. The remedies available to the Board are provided by statute as follows:
.. . If upon the preponderance of the testimony taken the [National Labor
Relations] Board shall be of the opinion that a person named in the complaint
has engaged in or is engaging in any such unfair labor practice, then the Board
. . . shall issue and cause to be served on such person an order requiring such
person to cease and desist from such unfair labor practice, and to take such
affirmative action including reinstatement of employees with or without back
pay, as will effectuate the policies of this subchapter ....
29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1970). Provisions for court review and enforcement of NLRB orders also
are provided by statute. Id. §§ 160(e)-(g).
6. FED. R. Cv. P. 23.
7. See Cohn, The New Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 54 GEO. L.J. 1204, 1214 (1966);
Ford, Federal Rule 23: A Device for Aiding the Small Claimant, 10 B.C. Th. & CoM. L. Rzy.
510 (1969); Developments in the Law-Employment Discrimination and Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, 84 Hv. L. REv. 1109, 1218-22 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Develop-
ments-Title VI.
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Because the 1972 amendments to Title VII gave the EEOC ex-
panded power to seek relief," private litigation under Title VII may
well be nearing its high-water mark. Moreover, because prior litiga-
tion has eliminated the earlier procedural obstacles and established
liberalized theories for imposing liability on employers, the focus
has shifted from procedural maneuvering to what the Court of Ap-
peals for the Fifth Circuit has characterized as the "recovery
stage,"9 that is, the practical design and implementation of reme-
dies for discrimination.
Title VII authorizes the federal courts to enjoin any discrimina-
tory employment practice and, where applicable, to order affirma-
tive relief."0 While the practical problems of fashioning such relief
are complex in the individual TitlE VII action, the complexity is
accentuated in the class recovery context, in which there is a vacil-
lating interface between the rights of aggrieved persons, unnamed
and only loosely identified, and fairness to respondent employers or
unions. Recent appellate court efforts to alleviate the tensions cre-
ated by these competing interests have not succeeded; rather, they
have decreed class relief in manners inappropriate to redress em-
ployment discrimination, thereby hampering district court at-
tempts to design relief founded upon the equities and practicalities
of a case. Several recent cases, by awarding classwide back pay have
evidenced a growing trend toward the punitive use of damages in
Title VII class actions. This inappropriate practice has been encour-
aged by *the developing concept of "fluid recovery" and by some
misconceptions about the federal class action procedure. Thorough
consideration of these problems can isolate the sources of judicial
misdirection and restore more appropriate use of the class action
procedure.
COMPENSATORY RELIEF AS A IREMEDY IN TrILE VII CLASS ACTIONS
Several recent federal appellate court decisions indicate that
S. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to e-17 (Supp. U, 1972), amending 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to e-15
(1970). These amendments empower the EEOC to bring a civil action against employers
accused of unlawful employment practices if it has been unable to secure an acceptable
conciliation agreement. The aggrieved person has a right to intervene in such an aciton; if
the Commission dismisses the charge filed with it or fails to bring a civil action, he may bring
suit in his own right.Id. § 200Oe-5(f)(1). The federal district courts have jurisdiction over suits
brought by the EEOC or aggrieved plaintiffs. Id. § 200e-5(f)(3).
9. Johnson v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 491 F.2d 1364, 1380 (5th Cir. 1974).
10. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (Supp. I1, 1972). Such affirmative relief most often involves
reinstatement and back pay.
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compensatory relief to the class is now a routine remedy in Title VII
class actions. In particular, three cases11 decided by courts well ex-
perienced in Title VII litigation presage what probably will become
a common form of relief, classwide compensatory back pay awards.
Each case involved perpetuation of past discriminatory practices
by facially neutral policies such as departmental seniority and em-
ployment tests. In Johnson v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.,12 the
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit found that Goodyear had
locked black employees into the previously segregated labor depart-
ment by requiring a high school diploma for an interdepartmental
transfer. Other facially neutral policies found to contribute to dis-
crimination were the. administration of unvalidated preemployment
and employment tests and the maintenance of a departmental sen-
iority system.13 The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit found in
Head v. Timken Roller Bearing Co.14 that racial discrimination in
hiring prior to the effective date of Title VII, when coupled with a
continuing departmental seniority system, constituted a policy of
racial assignment. 15 Likewise, in Moody v. Albemarle Paper Co.,"
the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that facially neutral
testing procedures not shown to have a substantial business justifi-
cation had a "differential impact on minority employment," render-
ing the practices unlawful.7
Both Head and Moody are significant because they held that an
award of back pay should accompany any finding of discrimination,
unless special circumstances are found to nullify such a presump-
tion.18 Even more specific was the statement in Johnson that "as a
11. Johnson v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 491 F.2d 1364 (Sth Cir. 1974); Head v. Timken
Roller Bearing Co., 486 F.2d 870 (6th Cir. 1973); Moody v. Albemarle Paper Co., 474 F.2d
134 (4th Cir. 1973), cert. granted, 95 S. Ct. 654 (Dec. 16, 1974) (No. 74-389).
12. 491 F.2d 1364 (5th Cir. 1974).
13. Id. at 1368-75. The departmental seniority system was the source of continued discrimi-
nation even after the more patently discriminatory devices were terminated. Until 1965, the
labor department was exclusively black and, although blacks were accepted into other depart-
ments as early as 1962, not until 1968 were employees allowed to transfer from the still
essentially all-black labor department to other sections. Even then the departmental seniority
system acted as an effective deterrent to any transfers, however, because anyone changing
departments lost all seniority, amounting in some cases to more than 20 years. Id. at 1369.
14. 486 F.2d 870 (6th Cir. 1973).
15. Id. at 875.
16. 474 F.2d 134 (4th Cir. 1973), cert. granted, 95 S. Ct. 654 (Dec. 16, 1974) (No. 74-389).
17. Id. at 138-40.
18. "[Ihe clear intent of Congress that the grant of authority under Title VII should be
broadly read and applied mandate[s] an award of back pay unless exceptional circumstan-
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matter of law .. .the members of [a] class of discriminatees are
presumptively entitled to an appropriate award of back pay unless
evidence is adduced to establish as a matter of fact that such dis-
criminatory practices did not adversely affect a particular claimant
(or claimants)."'"
While the appropriateness of a presumption of qualification for
back pay awards certainly is open to question, of more immediate
concern is the nature of these awards. Although these awards are
alleged to be compensatory, when they are computed, the awards
take on a distinct aura of being punitive.
Class Back Pay Awards: Compensatory or Punitive?
Because Title VII actions are equitable in nature, most courts
have recognized that equitable considerations apply to the conduct
of the proceedings.2 ' Similarly, relief awarded to an aggrieved party
also should be grounded on equitable principles,2 since there has
been explicit recognition that the power to award damages is a
corollary of the statutory grant of equitable jurisdiction.23 Courts
ces are present." 486 F.2d at 876. "[A] plaintiff or a complaining class who is successful in
obtaining an injunction under Title VII of the Act should ordinarily be awarded back pay
unless special circumstances would render such an award unjust." 474 F.2d at 142. See also
Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, 390 U.S. 400 (1968) (presumption of recovery of attor-
ney's fees in successful Title II suits).
19. 491 F.2d at 1374.
20. See, e.g., Stamps v. Detroit Edison Co., 365 F. Supp. 87 (E.D. Mich. 1973), rev'd in
part and af'd in part sub nom., EEOC v. Detroit Edison Co., 10 FEP CASEs 239 (6th Cir.
1975); Tooles v. Kellogg Co., 336 F. Supp. 14, 18 (D. Neb. 1972).
21. See, e.g., Pettway v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 494 F.2d 211, 257 (5th Cir. 1974);
Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 417 F.2d 1122, 1125 (5th Cir. 1969); McQueen v.
E.M.C. Plastic Co., 302 F. Supp. 881, 884 (E.D. Tex. 1969). See also Davidson, "Back Pay"
Awards Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 26 RUTGERs L. REv. 741,771-73 (1973).
22. Title VII provides that a court may enjoin an unlawful employment practice and order
affirmative action such as back pay, reinstatement, "or any other equitable relief." 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-5(g) (Supp. H, 1972). The appellate court in EEOC v. Detroit Edison Co., 10 FEP
CAsEs 239 (6th Cir. 1975), held that the statutory phrase "or any other equitable relief,"
provided no authority for the award of punitive damages. "We know of no authority which
holds that the awarding of punitive damages is equitable relief. ...While affirmative action
may not be limited to the reinstatement or hiring of employees with or without back pay, we
believe that it is limited to relief of the same general kind, that is, equitable relief in the form
of restitution." Id. at 244.
23. "The clear purpose of Title VII is to bring an end to the proscribed discriminatory
practices and to make whole, in a pecuniary fashion, those who have suffered by it." Bowe
v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 416 F.2d 711, 720 (7th Cir. 1969); accord, Johnson v. Goodyear Tire
& Rubber Co., 491 F.2d 1364, 1376 (5th Cir. 1974); Head v. Timken Roller Bearing Co., 486
F.2d 870, 876 (6th Cir. 1973); Moody v. Albemarle Paper Co., 474 F.2d 134, 142 (4th Cir.
1973).
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repeatedly have stressed that back pay awards are to be compensa-
tory, not punitive.24 The courts in both Head5 and Moody2 cited
with approval Robinson v. Lorillard Corp.,2 in which the Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit stated that "[a] back pay award is
not punitive in nature, but equitable - intended to restore the
recipients to their rightful economic status absent the effects of
unlawful discrimination." 2 The Johnson court reiterated this prop-
osition, stating that "back pay awards are not designed to punish
the employer but to economically elevate the victims to the status
which is rightfully theirs. '2
That back pay awards are to be made only to those class members
who are able to demonstrate injury from discrimination0 further
indicates the impropriety of punitive damages in Title VII recovery.
The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit expressly instructed
district courts that a "back pay award is limited to damages that
are actually suffered."' 3' This instruction was applied by that court
in Stamps v. Detroit Edison Co.,32 which expressly held that Title
VII provided no authority for the award of punitive damages.
In Detroit Edison the district court had held that the affected
class included not only those black employees hired prior to its
decree and actively employed during the effective term of Title VII,
but also all black individuals who applied for employment after the
effective date of Title VII and were rejected, as well as blacks who
would have applied but for Detroit Edison's discriminatory hiring
practices.33 In addition to an injunction against further discrimina-
24. See also Developments-Title VII, supra note 7, at 1259-69.
25. 486 F.2d at 876.
26. 474 F.2d at 142.
27. 444 F.2d 791 (4th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 404 U.S. 1006 (1971).
28. Id. at 802.
29. 491 F.2d at 1376.
30. See Johnson v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 491 F.2d 1364,1375 (5th Cir. 1974); Head
v. Timken Roller Bearing Co., 486 F.2d 870, 878 (6th Cir. 1973); Moody v. Albemarle Paper
Co., 474 F.2d 134, 142 (4th Cir. 1973).
31. Head v. Timken Roller Bearing Co., 486 F.2d 870, 878 (6th Cir. 1973); accord, United
States v. Masonry Contractors Ass'n, 497 F.2d 871, 876 (6th Cir. 1974).
32. 365 F. Supp. 87 (E.D. Mich. 1973), rev'd in part and aff'd in part sub nom, EEOC v.
Detroit Edison, 10 FEP CASEs 239 (6th Cir. 1975). Punitive damages were suggested as a
remedy in appropriate Title VII actions in Tooles v. Kellogg Co., 336 F. Supp. 14, 18 (D. Neb.
1972) (denial of motion to strike portion of complaint). The Court of Appeals for ihe Ninth
Circuit has declined to rule on the propriety of punitive damages in such actions. Gregory v.
Litton Systems, Inc., 472 F.2d 631, 632 n.1 (9th Cir. 1972).
33. 365 F. Supp. at 121-22, 124.
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tion and an award of compensatory relief in the form of back pay
and preferential hiring, the district court also ordered Detroit Edi-
son to pay this expansive class four million dollars in punitive dam-
ages.34
While punitive damages are a recognized means to punish and
deter particularly egregious conduct,35 the absence of any such con-
duct in Detroit Edison is striking. The court did not find, for exam-
ple, that the employer had maintained segregated facilities; in-
stead, there was an inference of unlawful discrimination drawn from
a statistical imbalance between white and black employees, insuffi-
cient job posting, maintenance of departmental seniority, hiring of
friends and relatives of current employees, and use of unvalidated
tests.5 Even if punitive damages were an accepted means of redress
under Title VII, their use in such a factual context cannot be justi-
fied.
Compensatory Relief: A Remedy Only for Persons Actually Injured
and Injuries Actually Suffered
Fashioning compensatory relief for discrimination never has been
simple, even in an individual suit. In class actions, it may be un-
manageable to mold remedies for a class containing thousands of
loosely identified individuals, many of whom may never have suf-
34. Id. In addition to the employer, one local union, named as a codefendant, was assessed
$250,000 in punitive damages. Id. at 124.
However, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit in EEOC v. Detroit Edison Co., 10
FEP CAsEs 239 (6th Cir. 1975), reversed that portion of the district court's decision which
involved the composition of the class to benefit from the award of back pay. The inclusion of
the two groups composed of black individuals who had been rejected for employment and
those blacks who did not apply for employment as a result of the employer's alleged "discrimi-
natory practices," within the bounds of this class action, was rejected by the appellate court
on the following grounds: first, a formal class action determination was never made and the
parties proceeded to trial on the basis of a court order which had the effect of limiting the
class to current black employees; second, the requirement of rule 23 (a) (4) that the individual
plaintiffs have a community of interest with both sub-classes was not met in this case. Id.
at 245. The court thus concluded that "[t]he private plaintiffs in the present case, did not
by pleading or proof, sufficiently advise the court for it to define a class represented by these
plaintiffs as including anyone but black employees of Edison." Id. at 246.
35. See, e.g., Lundgren v. Freeman, 307 F.2d 104, 119 n.13 (9th Cir. 1962) (exemplary
damages allowed in Oregon when a defendant's malice, fraud, or gross negligence persuades
the court that additional damages are justified by way of punishment and as a warning to
others); Santiesteban v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 306 F.2d 9, 12 (5th Cir. 1962) (punitive
damages permitted in Florida right-of-privacy actions that include an element of malice); 15
U.S.C. § 15 (1970) (treble damages for federal antitrust violations).
36. 365 F. Supp. at 116-19.
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fered from the unlawful employment practices found by the court.
Consequently, the appellate courts that have considered the ques-
tion of compensatory relief to a class uniformly have limited back
pay awards to damages actually suffered.3 Typifying this approach,
one court has held that, when back pay is ordered, not every class
member is necessarily entitled to recovery."
This principle, that only persons actually injured by individual
practices should be compensated and those only for injuries actually
suffered, is consistent with due process of law and familiar tenets
of equitable discretion. 9 The complexity of designing affirmative
relief in class actions seems to strain this precept unduly, however,
causing it to be mislaid in practice.
An example of the violence done in the name of justice to the
principle of compensatory relief is furnished by Pettway v. Ameri-
can Cast Iron Pipe Co.4" Prior to 1961, the company had maintained
a strict delineation of jobs as exclusively black or exclusively white.
Thus, although departments within the company were not totally
segregated, they were predominately of one race. Despite th' discon-
tinuance of this formal separation, the court found that the em-
ployer's facially neutral testing program and educational require-
ments, in combination with a departmental seniority system and
job posting and bidding practices, continued to lock black employ-
ees into lower paying jobs and to bar admission into apprenticeship
and on-the-job training programs, thereby perpetuating past dis-
crimination."1
In its decree dismantling this system, the Pettway court also or-
dered an award of back pay to put in their rightful places those who
were injured by the company's employment practices. 2 Although
37. See note 30 supra & accompanying text.
38. In Johnson v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 491 F.2d 1364, 1375 (5th Cir. 1974), the
court stated:
Individual circumstances vary and not all members of the class are automati-
cally entitled to recovery. There should be a separate determination on an
individual basis as to who is entitled to recovery and the amount of such recov-
ery ....
.. . The relief herein ordered is intended to restore those wronged to their
rightful economic status absent the effects of the unlawful discrimination. As
to monetary relief, nothing more is required; nothing less is acceptable.
39. See H. OLECK, DAmmaGs TO PERSONS AND PROPERTY § 1 (1961).
40. 494 F.2d 211 (5th Cir. 1974).
41. Id. at 235-36.
42. Id. at 252.
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recognizing "the impossibility of calculating the precise amount of
back pay,"43 the court was undeterred by the prospect of a "quag-
mire of hypothetical judgments"4 and permitted award of back pay
merely upon a showing that an individual was a member of the
affected class. 5 No obligation was imposed upon class members to
demonstrate the fact or degree of any injury; rather, the company
was required to show by clear and convincing evidence that the
alleged class member was not entitled to back pay." Such a proce-
dure belies the court's stated purpose of only putting victims of
unlawful practices in a position equivalent to that which they would
have occupied but for the discrimination."
This questionable conceptualization of compensatory relief in
class actions has been employed similarly in other cases. The dis-
trict court's decision in Stamps v. Detroit Edison Co.4" aptly illus-
trates the use of inference upon inference to formulate an approxi-
mate class award, even though there is no factual basis in the class,
or even in the individual case, for drawing such inferences. There
all members of an expansive class were to be paid an amount equal
to the average earnings of certain "skilled trades high opportunity
43. Id. at 260.
44. The court stated:
There is no way of determining which jobs the class members would have bid
on and have obtained if discriminatory testing, seniority, posting and bidding
system, and apprentice and on-the-job training programs had not been in exist-
ence. Class members outnumber promotion vacancies; jobs have become avail-
able only over a period of time; the vacancies enjoy different pay rates; and a
determination of who was entitled to the vacancy would have to he determined
on a judgment of seniority and ability at that time. This process creates a
quagmire of hypothetical judgments.
Id. See also Johnson v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 491 F.2d 1364, 1379 (5th Cir. 1974),
where the court noted: "All of the employee's previous actions were taken against a backdrop
of discrimination. It is now extremely difficult for a court to separate a discriminatee's
psychological or motivational outlook which [was] so totally interwined with the discrimina-
tory atmosphere at the. . . plant. What a laborer would have subjectively done in an atmos-
phere free of racial discrimination is now a matter of pure conjecture."
45. 494 F.2d at 259-60.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 252. The court stated: "Under Title VII... the injured workers must be restored
to the economic position in which they would have been but for the discrimination - their
'rightful place.' "The court set out two principles governing its back pay award: (1) unrealis-
tic exactitude is not required in back pay awards; (2) uncertainties in determining what an
employee would have earned but for the discrimination should be resolved against the dis-
criminating employer. Id. at 260-61.
48. 365 F. Supp. 87 (E.D. Mich. 1973). See notes 33-36 supra & accompanying text.
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jobs," less actual earnings, from the effective date of Title V]I.' 9
Such a windfall hardly could be considered compensatory; recipi-
ents of back pay would include blacks who had never applied for a
higher level job, those unqualified to perform in skilled classifica-
tions, and those who would not have been promoted even under a
lawful promotional scheme because the number of eligible employ-
ees exceeded the available promotional opportunities.
Sabala v. Western Gillette, Inc.," provides a similar example. In
Sabala the district court held that proof of specific discrimination
against a member of the affected class was not prerequisite to col-
lecting back pay5 Thus, a black "city driver" need never have
applied for a job as an "over-the-road" driver in order to receive
back pay. Instead, he need only accept such an opportunity, which
the company was required to offer him, in the future. If he did
accept, he would receive, in addition to the earnings of his new
position, a lump sum equal to 1.56 times his total city-driver earn-
ings for the period during which his seniority would have enabled
him to become a road driver, less actual earnings and a 10 percent
road expense factor.2 The Sabala court, in an attempt to do justice
to the class, clearly disregarded the raison d'etre for compensatory
damages: the compensation only of those actually injured for dam-
ages actually suffered.
The impropriety of the Sabala approach is demonstrated by the
recent decision in Thornton v. East Texas Motor Freight.53 In a
factual situation virtually identical to Sabala, the Court of Appeals
for the Sixth Circuit approved a district court ruling that black city
drivers, members of the affected class, first must demonstrate their
past expression of interest in over-the-road positions before becom-
ing a part of the "recovery class."54 The court noted: "[Ihe pros-
pect of a large back pay award invalidates present intention as an
accurate indication of past intention. An employee who may not
have wanted on-the-road employment in the late 1960's because of
49. 365 F. Supp. at 121-22.
50. 371 F. Supp. 385 (S.D: Tex. 1974).
51. Id. at 391.
52. The award was based on the ratio of the earnings of a reasonably prudent over-the-
road driver to the earnings of a comparable city driver (1.56: 1), with deductions based on
expenditures by a reasonably prudent employee in connection with his employment as an
over-the-road driver (10 percent of gross annual pay). Id. at 391-92.
53. 497 F.2d 416 (6th Cir. 1974).
54. Id. at 421-22.
1975]
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
the increased number of hours of work and time away from home,
might well change his mind now if the prospect of a large back pay
windfall is presented."55
There are, of course, class actions to challenge discriminatory
employment practices in which back pay relief can be categorized
accurately as compensatory, such as the discriminatory layoff of a
class 5 or equal pay claims when the class is reasonably determina-
ble.57 In some other familiar areas of Title VII class action practice,
however, such as perpetuation of past discriminatory practices by
departmental seniority, unvalidated tests, and failure to hire or
promote evidenced by statistical analyses, 8 the classes usually are
quite amorphous and the characterization of back pay relief to the
class as "compensatory," rather than "punitive," is highly question-
able.
In class action distributions of the amorphous type there is often
simply no way to know if each class member is an injured person;
damages frequently are uncertain and speculative. In the Fifth
Circuit, however, there is now such a strong presumption of injury
to a member of the class that the defendant must come forward
with "clear and convincing evidence"5 to show that the claimant
was not injured. The burden, both in time and expense, as well
as in fact, is so virtually unsustainable that the court in Pettway
has suggested negotiating a formula-type approach.60 Ironically,
55. Id. at 422.
56. See, e.g., Bowe v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 416 F.2d 711 (7th Cir. 1969). In Bowe, women
discriminatorily laid off were to be compensated "at the highest rate of pay for such jobs as
they would have bid on/and qualified for if a non-discriminatory seniority scheme would have
been in existence." Id. at 721. Thus, uncertainties in determining the rate of compensation
persisted to some extent even in this case.
57. In Laffey v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 366 F. Supp. 763 (D.D.C. 1973), the airline was
found to have violated Title VII by, among other means, paying stewardesses lower salaries
and pensions than male pursers for equal work. Id. at 789. Pay claim equalization, if ordered
under these facts, would award similar compensation to all members of the affected class.
58. These questions are precisely the kind involved in Johnson, Head, Moody, and
Pettway. See notes 12-17, 40-47 supra & accompanying text.
59. Pettway v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 494 F.2d 211, 259-60 (5th Cir. 1974); Johnson
v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 491 F.2d 1364, 1379-80 (5th Cir. 1974).
60. 494 F.2d at 262 n.152. The court proposed a number of possible approaches. In less
complex cases fairly precise determinations of what each individual claimant's position would
have been, but for the discrimination, might be possible. Id. at 261. Where greater complexity
enters into the determination, awards might be based on average pay in positions from which
the discriminated group has been excluded, id. at 262, or on comparisons with the earnings
of groups of employees, not injured by discrimination, similar in size, ability, and length of
employment to the discriminatees, id. at 262-63.
[Vol. 16:507
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the court still speaks of individual claims while acknowledging
that they are almost impossible to compute."
Courts have paid lip-service to the concept of compensatory relief
while ignoring its fundamental characteristic when rendering an
award. Indeed, these decisions to "compensate" the victims have
been made to make examples of the defendants in an effort to has-
ten the demise of discrimination; relief of thig sort, however, once
again resembles exemplary or punitive rather than compensatory
damages. Compensatory damages generally "will compensate the
injured party for the injury sustained, and nothing more."62 No
windfall or profit is to be accorded in such an award. Nevertheless,
that is clearly the outcome when class members are not required to
prove affirmatively their injury and the precise amount thereof.
Moreover, when courts recognize the "impossibility of calculating
the precise amount of back pay"" and suggest negotiations or gross
awards64 that ignore the individual right of recovery upon which a
class suit is premised, the computation and award of back pay
becomes more than a question of imprecision. Awards for uncertain
and speculative damages, contingent upon numerous assumptions,
realistically cannot masquerade as compensatory relief,6" and would
not be tolerated in any other area of the law.
61. Courts frequently have noted the difficulty of calculating the appropriate amount of a
back pay award. See, e.g., Pettway v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 494 F.2d 211, 260 (5th
Cir. 1974); Sabala v. Western Gillette, Inc., 371 F. Supp. 385, 392 (S.D. Tex. 1974) ('The
variety of formulae by which individual back pay due this class of discriminatees can be
computed is bewildering. . ").
62. McKnight v. Denny, 198 Pa. 323,., 47 A. 970, 971 (1901). Seegenerally Morgan v.
Southern Pac. Co., 95 Cal. 501, 30 P. 601 (1892); Sachra v. Town of Manilla, 120 Iowa 562,
95 N.W. 198 (1903).
63. Pettway v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 494 F.2d 211, 260 (5th Cir. 1974).
64. Id. at 260-63.
65. Even precisely calculated back pay awards may be more punitive than compensatory.
For example, in cases in which departmental seniority systems are said to perpetuate past
discrimination, any back pay award againstthe employer is clearly punitive, because employ-
ers had no notice that such a system would lead to liability under Title VII. In most instances,
in fact, the employer probably has suffered an economic loss because of the use of such
systems, which generally were not employer-created, but rather resulted almost entirely from
union pressure. The employer certainly would prefer the ability to place employees in those
jobs for which it believes they are best qualified, regardless of length of service. For example,
in Johnson v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 491 F.2d 1364 (5th Cir. 1974), the defendant
employer tried unilaterally to modify its collective bargaining agreement, which imposed
departmental seniority; the attempt was thwarted, however, by a preliminary injunction
obtained by the union. Id. at 1381-82.
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Class Back Pay Awards and "Fluid Recovery"
A conclusion to the controversy over class back pay awards is not
in sight. Significantly, in Bowe v. Colgate-Palmolive,66 tried in 1967
as one of the first major cases awarding classwide back pay, the final
details of the pay arrangement have not yet been settled. This com-
plex and time-consuming process raises serious questions about the
efficacy of class actions in Title VII for any purpose other than pure
injunctive or declaratory relief. The difficulties thus engendered
appear to be leading courts increasingly to consider ordering negoti-
ated or gross awards of back pay instead of making individual deter-
minations.
The concept of the gross award has been confronted in class ac-
tions in areas other than Title VII. In the celebrated Eisen v. Carli-
sle & Jacquelin cases,6" a district court, a circuit court, and the
Supreme Court wrestled with the method by which damages were
to be computed to compensate a class of several million people
victimized by a monopolization scheme in stock trading. The dis-
trict court estimated that damages to the six million class members
would not exceed sixty million dollars, but instead of computing
individual claims, the court computed the total injury to the class
and granted a gross award. Thereafter, individuals who came for-
ward with claims would have them satisfied, and the residue would
be used to pay attorney fees, defray administrative costs, and possi-
66. 489 F.2d 896 (7th Cir. 1974), modifying 416 F.2d 711 (7th Cir. 1969). See note 94 infra.
67. See Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 94 S. Ct. 2140 (1974), vacating 479 F.2d 1005 (2d
Cir. 1973). The case was heard on three occasions by the Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit. In Eisen I the court ruled that denial of class action status by the district court was
appealable as a final order. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 370 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1966), cert.
denied, 386 U.S. 1035 (1967). Then, in Eisen I, the dismissal of the class action was reversed.
Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 391 F.2d 555 (2d Cir. 1968). Upon remand, the district court
issued an order holding the suit maintainable as a class action, and suggesting a "fluid class"
recovery that would distribute damages to future members of the aggrieved class rather than
to specific class members who actually were injured. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 52 F.R.D.
253 (S.D.N.Y. 1971). See notes 70-71 infra & accompanying text. Objecting to notice require-
ments set out by the district court, the court of appeals issued Eisen IX, ordering the suit
dismissed as a class action. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 479 F.2d 1005 (2d Cir. 1973). On
certiorari, the Supreme Court remanded the case to the trial court, finding that the district
court's resolution of the notice problem failed to comply with rule 23(c)(2), which was held
to require notice to each ascertainable member of the class with the costs of notice to be borne
by the plaintiff. Eisen v. Carlisle.& Jacquelin, 94 S. Ct. 2140 (1974).
68. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 52 F.R.D. 253, 257, 265 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), rev'd, 479 F.2d
1005 (2d Cir. 1973), vacated, 94 S. Ct. 2140 (1974).
69. Id. at 264-65.
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bly lower the future cost of odd-lot trading."
This "fluid recovery" concept, by which a gross award is com-
puted in lieu of aggregating the estimated individual claims, is dan-
gerously related to the approaches suggested in Detroit Edison and
Pettway. Unfortunately, when confronted with the difficulties of
fashioning the actual mechanics of an individualized award, many
courts may resort to fluid recovery even if-not so denominated. Fluid
recovery, moreover, is an even more questionable concept than the
Title VII awards granted in cases such as Pettway, and it ultimately
was found deficient in the consumer class action in Eisen.1
Unjustified fluid recovery should not be allowed to engulf Title
VII relief. The grave inequities that can be inflicted by punitive
back pay awards can no more be justified by expediency in this
context than in the area of consumer protection. The Eisen deci-
sions not only have illustrated the need to analyze carefully the
relief to be granted in Title VII class actions; they also have elicited
a need to review the overall impact of the requirements of rule 23
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure upon the issue of back pay
awards.
THE MISAPPLICATION OF RULE 23 IN TITLE VII CLASS ACTIONS
The General Distinction Between Rules 23(b)(2) and 23 (b)(3)
Many of the deficiencies of class back pay awards in Title VII
cases stem from a misapplication by some courts of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, particularly rules 23(b)(2) and 23(b)(3) 72
70. Id.
71. In Eisen III, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit found the fluid recovery
concept violative of the class action provisions, of due process, and of rule 28 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. Writing for the court, Judge Medina concluded:
Even if amended Rule 23 could be read so as to permit any such fantastic
procedure, the courts would have to reject it as an unconstitutional violation of
the requirement of due process of law. But as it now reads amended Rule 23
contemplates and provides for no such procedure. Nor can amended Rule 23 be
construed or interpreted in such fashion as to permit such procedure. We hold
the "fluid recovery" concept and practice to be illegal, inadmissible as a solution
of the manageability problems of class actions and wholly improper.
479 F.2d at 1018.
72. FED. R. Cirv. P. 23(b)(2), (3). For a detailed discussion of the history of class actions,
culminating in rule 23, and the distinctions between rules 23(b)(2) and 23(b)(3), see Kaplan,
Continuing Work of the Civil Committee: 1966 Amendments of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, 81 HARv. L. Rav. 356, 375-400 (1967). Those who misinterpret the proper function
of rule 23(b)(3) see it simply as the modem counterpart of the old spurious action. Rule
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A class action is maintainable under rule 23(a) provided certain
prerequisites, 73 such as numerous class members,74 common factual
and legal questions,75 and representativeness, 7 are present. Class
actions also must conform, however, to certain requirements in rule
23(b). A class action may be maintained under rule 23(b)(2) if "the
party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds
generally applicable to the class, thereby making appropriate final
injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief with respect to
the class as a whole. .... ',71 Rule 23(b)(2) was designed in part to
facilitate civil rights class actions such as those brought under Title
VII.78 Nevertheless, the Advisory Committee on the civil rules noted
that rule 23(b)(2) "does not extend to cases in which the appropriate
final relief relates exclusively or predominantly to money dam-
ages,"79 but is intended to serve primarily as a vehicle for injunctive
or declaratory relief."
23(b)(3) has as its purpose the protection of the many parties who are injured as a result of
the defendant's act or omission affecting a great mass of people. Rule 23(b)(2) is narrower in
scope and has been considered well adapted to incidents of employment discrimination be-
cause an entire discriminatory situation is treated at once with no opting out. Id.
73. FED. R. Cirv. P. 23(a) provides:
One or more members of a class may sue or be sued as representative parties
on behalf of all only if (1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members
is impracticable, (2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class, (3)
the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or
defenses of the class, and (4) the representative parties will fairly and ade-
quately protect the interests of the class.
74. FED. R. Cirv. P. 23(a)(1). Although the class must be shown to be large enough to
preclude joinder, it has been held that "[ilt is unnecessary to name names. . . extensively
.. " Williams v. Local 19, Sheet Metal Workers, 59 F.R.D. 49, 52 (E.D. Pa. 1973).
75. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(2).
76. FED. R. Cirv. P. 23 (a)(3), (4). The representativeness requirements are to be construed
broadly in cLvil rights litigation because Congress' purpose in establishing these civil rights
laws was to end all discrimination, not only that proved to be aimed at one employee by one
employer. Thus the individual employee necessarily acts on behalf of all those whose rights
have been denied. Jenkins v. United Gas Corp., 400 F.2d 28, 32-33 (5th Cir. 1968); Mack v.
General Elec. Co., 329 F. Supp. 72, 75-76 (E.D. Pa. 1971). Regarding the adequacy of repre-
sentation necessitated by rule 23(a)(4), two criteria are called for by the courts. First, the
attorney must be qualified, experienced, and able to conduct the litigation. Second, the suit
can neither be collusive nor can the plaintiff's interests be antagonistic to those of the rest of
the class. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 391 F.2d 555, 562 (2d Cir. 1968).
77. Fan. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2).
78. See FED. R. Cirv. P. 23(b)(2), 1966 Advisory Committee Note, in 3B J. Moons, FEDERAL
PRATcE T 23.01 [10.-2], at 23-28 (2d ed. 1974).
79. Id.
80. Id.; see McAdory v. Scientific Research Instruments, Inc., 355 F. Supp. 468, 472 (D.
Md. 1973).
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Rule 23(b) (2) does not require any particular form of notice to the
class nor does it permit class members to opt out of the lawsuit. Rule
23(b) (3),81 on the other hand, adds significantly to the requirements
of rule 23(a). Certification of a class action under rule 23(b)(3) re-
quires special notification under rule 23(c)(2) and permits class
members to request exclusion from the class.82 Rule 23(b)(3) also
differs significantly by not requiring a class action to be brought
primarily for injunctive or declaratory relief instead of monetary
damages. 3
The distinctions between rules 23(b)(2) and 23(b)(3) bear heavily
upon a consideration of Title VII classwide back pay awards and
perhaps other monetary relief. A fundamental question is whether
an action is primarily for injunctive relief when substantial back
pay is sought. By considering back pay to be equitable in nature and
accordingly incidental to injunctive relief, as several recent deci-
sions have done,8 recovery has been permitted in class actions
81. FED. R. Crv. P. 23(b)(3) provides:
An action may be maintained as a class action if the prerequisites of subdivi-
sion (a) are satisfied, and in addition:
(3) the court finds that the questions of law or fact common to the members
of the class predominate over any questions affecting only individual members,
and that a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and
efficient adjudication of the controversy. The matters pertinent to the findings
include: (A) the interest of members of the class in individually controlling the
prosecution or defense of separate actions; (B) the extent and nature of any
litigation concerning the controversy already commenced by or against members
of the class; (C) the desirability or undesirability of concentrating the litigation
of the claims in the particular forum; (D) the difficulties likely to be encoun-
tered in the management of a class action.
82. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2) provides:
In any class action maintained under subdivision (b)(3), the court shall direct
to the members of the class the best notice practicable under the circumstances,
including individual notice to all members who can be identified through rea-
sonable effort. The notice shall advise each member that (A) the court will
exclude him from the class if he so requests by a specified date; (B) the judg-
ment, whether favorable or not, will include all members who do not request
exclusion; and (C) any member who does not request exclusion may, if he
desires, enter an appearance through his counsel.
83. See 3B J. MooRE, supra note 78, %1 23.40, 23.45 [1], at 23-654, 22-678; 7A C. WMuGorr
& A. MMLER, FEDERAL PRAMCCE & PRocEuRE § 1775, at 22-23 (1972).
84. See, e.g., Pettway v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 494 F.2d 211, 251-54 (5th Cir. 1974);
Johnson v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 491 F.2d 1364, 1375 (5th Cir. 1974); Head v. Timken
Roller Bearing Co., 486 F.2d 870, 876 (6th Cir. 1973); Moody v. Albemarle Paper Co., 474
F.2d 134, 142 (4th Cir. 1973).
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brought pursuant to rule 23(b)(2),s without the significant safe-
guards that are provided by rule 23(b)(3). Such a shortcoming can
only worsen the already severe strains being placed upon the Title
VII class action.
Applicability of Rule 23(b)(2) in Title VII Class Actions
While class actions brought pursuant to rule 23(b)(2) must be
primarily for injunctive or declaratory relief,8 back pay can be
awarded as an additional equitable remedy. In Robinson v. Loril-
lard Corp.ss a class action was brought on behalf of blacks hired by
the defendant when overt discrimination was practiced prior to en-
actment of Title VII. Alleging that the existing seniority system at
Lorillard perpetuated the effects of the earlier discrimination, the
plaintiffs sought declaratory relief as well as damages in the form
of back pay. The Court of Appeals for.the Fourth Circuit affirmed
the lower court ruling that the plaintiffs and their class were entitled
to all forms of relief requested," stating that the back pay award was
rooted in grounds uniformly applicable to the class and that it
should be considered as one element of an equitable remedy.89 The
court noted, however, that the decision to award back pay to the
class was not the equivalent of giving back pay to each class
member. Individual relief would not be appropriate, the court said,
until each member proved a loss resulting from the practice." An
argument that a class certification pursuant to rule 23(b)(2) pre-
cluded a classwide back pay award did not persuade the court.
85. See notes 87-90 infra & accompanying text. Cf. Baxter v. Savannah Sugar Ref. Corp.,
350 F. Supp. 139, 141 (S.D. Ga. 1972), affd in part, remanded in part, rev'd in part on other
grounds, 495 F.2d 437 (5th Cir. 1974).
86. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2).
87. 444 F.2d 791 (4th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1006 (1972).
88. Id. at 795.
89. Id. at 801-02.
90. Id. at 802 n.14.
91. The court noted: "There is nothing in [Professor Moore's treatise], in the Advisory
Committee's Note, or in any case cited to us which supports the proposition that no monetary
relief may be ordered in a class action under Rule 23(b)(2)." Id. at 802.
Pettway v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 494 F.2d 211 (5th Civ. 1974), echoes this belief.
The Pettway court, when awarding substantial classwide back pay, stated:
Subdivision (b)(2) is "keyed to the effect of the relief sought, and the prag-
matic ramifications of adjudiciation in each situation, rather than any special
attributes of the class involved". . . . [Rule 23(b)(2)] is not to be read as
saying "thereby making appropriate only final injunctive relief or corresponding
declaratory relief." All that need be determined is that conduct of the party
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Although it thus may not seem improper to award this form of
monetary recovery in rule 23(b)(2) class actions, superior alterna-
tives have been adopted by other courts. In Paddison v. Fidelity
Bank,92 for example, a district court rejected the reasoning of
Robinson by holding that only individually named plaintiffs could
recover back pay. 3 The Paddison court recognized that the extreme
inefficiency of classwide back pay awards" detracted from the fun-
damental benefit of class actions, efficiency of disposition. More-
over, its holding would prevent the avoidance of the more appropri-
ate procedure of rule 23(b)(3):
In a nutshell, these cases have allowed the very real adminis-
trative and substantive problems raised in the determination of
back pay awards to individual class members to avoid the scru-
tiny under the criteria of 23(b) (3) to which they would normally
be subject by denominating them equitable relief in the context
of a Title VII action. The motivation of these decisions is admi-
rable-a desire for full justice-but full justice includes
procedural fairness to a losing defendant as well. Style it what
you will, back pay disputes raise all the traditional (b)(3) prob-
lems. '-
The court also rejected the use of "subclasses" to alleviate the bur-
dens of a classwide award,9" and concluded: 'it is not in the best
opposing the class is such as makes such equitable relief appropriate. This is
no limitation on the power of the court to grant other relief to the established
class ....
Id. at 256-57.
92. 60 F.R.D. 695 (E.D. Pa. 1973).
93. The court circumscribed the proper limits of rule 23(b)(2):
[ClIass actions administered solely under (b)(2) were to remain as free of the
pitfalls of past money disputes as is consistent with the complete litigation of
the causes of action of the named plaintiffs, whether or not those disputes might
in some sense be called "equitable." Thus it is our position that pursuant to a
(b)(2) designation standing alone, named plaintiffs may recover past damages
but unnamed class members may not.
Id. at 697.
94. Such inefficiency is epitomized by the extensive haggling over formulas and technicali-
ties in the Bowe v. Colgate-Palmolive Co. litigation. See Bowe v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 489
F.2d 896 (7th Cir. 1973); Bowe v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 416 F.2d 711 (7th Cir. 1969), rev'g
in part 272 F. Supp. 332 (S.D. Ind. 1967).
95. 60 F.R.D. at 698.
96. Id. The Paddison court observed:
It has been suggested that past damage issues in a (b)(9) class action might
properly be handled by the creation of 'sub-classes', but this does not really
solve any problems, or face the fact that many parts of a broad-based (b)(2)
1975]
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interests of the orderly administration of justice that (b)(2) should
be used for (b)(3) functions. 9 7
This conclusion in Paddison accords with the holding of the Court
of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in Air Line Stewards Local 550
v. American Airlines, Inc. 8 Partially because of the substantial back
pay recovery sought,9 the court of appeals held that the trial court's
certification of a class pursuant to rule 23(b)(2) was erroneous, al-
though the challenge to the defendants' pregnancy discharge policy
was allowed to continue as a rule 23(b) (3) action.1 9 The question of
class certification arose when the trial court refused to permit
absent class members to opt out of the class, a right that they would
have only in a rule 23(b) (3) case. Reversing the district court's deci-
sion, the appellate court described the true nature of the suit:
"When the airlines ended their discharge policy, the actions became
virtually moot as far as the currently employed stewardesses were
concerned, and purely prospective relief against the practice be-
came of little moment. The (b)(3) character of the actions, while
always present to the discharged stewardesses, became even more
obvious." 01
It may be presumed that the class in Air Line Stewards was large;
nevertheless, it cannot be denied that the suit was an appropriate
one for back pay relief, since compensatory damages were not specu-
lative but readily ascertainable for each class member. 0 2 Signifi-
cantly, however, because the unlawful practice had been
discontinued, the court of appeals astutely perceived the case as one
essentially for back pay, thus properly to be confined to a rule
23(b) (3) action. The requirement of rule 23(b) (2) that a class action
be primarily for injunctive or declaratory relief similarly would not
seem to accommodate back pay suits when a class or subclass of
former employees complain, because as in a challenge to discontin-
ued conduct, the only logical benefit to be derived from a determi-
Title VII class should possibly not properly have issues of past money damages
adjudicated through the class action device at all. The problems of proof and
resjudicata are often simply too great.
Id.
97. Id.
98. 490 F.2d 636 (7th Cir. 1973).
99. Id. at 642-43.
100. Id. at 643.
101. Id.
102. See notes 56-57 supra & accompanying text.
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nation of unlawful employment practices is the recovery of back
pay.103
At least one district court within the Fifth Circuit has recognized
that a challenge to a discontinued discriminatory policy belongs
within rule 23(b) (3) rather than rule 23(b)(2). In Baham v. Southern
Bell Telephone & Telegraph Co. 04 several provisions of a collective
bargaining agreement, not present in the agreement effective at the
time of suit, were challenged in a Title VII class action. The court
found that the suit was not primarily for injunctive relief and there-
fore was inappropriate for rule 23(b)(2) certification. The court
stated:
Class actions under 23(b)(2) are not appropriate for the type
of relief which is sought here .... Rule 23(b)(2) is simply not
designed to require the court to examine the particular circum-
stances affecting each individual member of the class. Class
suits developed as a tool in equity to promote the efficient litiga-
tion of certain types of controversies. The use of rule 23(b)(2) in
the suggested fashion would hardly promote efficiency; indeed,
one can envision the potential for unmanageability inherent in
this unintended use of the device."°5
This language is not necessarily irreconcilable with the recent deci-
sions of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in Johnson and
Pettway, because the Baham court left open the possibility of a rule
23(b)(2) suit that demanded prospective as well as monetary re-
lief.0 ' Nevertheless, Baham leaves hope that the Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit may align itself with the Air Line Stewards
rationale when confronted with a case involving discontinued un-
lawful practices.
An additional consideration is involved when the defendant alters
its previously unlawful policy while a class action is pending. In
Arkansas Education Association v. Board of Education'07 the Court
103. In Chrapliwy v. Uniroyal, Inc., Civil No. 72-5-243 (N.D. Ind., Feb. 27, 1974), Air Line
Stewards was construed by a district court in the Seventh Circuit to require class certification
under rule 23(b)(3) whenever substantial classwide back pay is sought. Id.
104. 55 F.R.D. 478 (W.D. La. 1972).
105. Id. at 480-81.
106. The court stated: "A question could also arise concerning whether the addition of a
demand for prospective relief coupled with the demand for monetary relief might, under
certain circumstances allow both actions to be brought under Rule 23(b)(2). Since the ques-
tion of prospective relief is moot, the question does not arise here." Id. at 481.
107. 446 F.2d 763 (8th Cir. 1971).
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of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit concluded that under such circum-
stances a class action otherwise properly brought under rule
23(b)(2) could not be dismissed, thus apparently accepting the re-
medial approach of the Fourth and Fifth Circuits to the question of
back pay claims in rule 23(b)(2) suits.10 8
When substantial classwide back pay is sought in a Title VII class
action, it can be seen that no consensus exists regarding the proper
approach to class certification. Although the courts permitting use
of rule 23(b)(2) have been deluded by an unfulfilled hope for effi-
ciently managed claims, and conceivably by a desire to avoid the
complexities of rule 23(b)(3), an alternative exists that can provide
a more rational treatment of these suits. Before the cases became
clouded by guilt reactions to the history of racism in the United
States, Professor Moore had suggested that, in actions in which
classwide back pay is sought, the court should bifurcate the action,
creating a rule 23(b)(2) class for injunctive relief and a rule 23(b)(3)
class for monetary relief."' Certification of the latter class could
await determination of the merits of issues raised in the injunction
suit."0
A bifurcated approach would allow isolation of those class mem-
bers actually injured by the practices enjoined in the preliminary
branch of the lawsuit."' In the subsequent rule 23(b)(3) portion of
the action, the class could be certified to conform to the Title VII
mandate that compensatory relief be accorded only to those individ-
uals who have suffered actual injury from the unlawful practice.
This appropriate class would be more manageable than the un-
wieldy classes that contain numerous uninjured claimants; more-
over, the sometimes crushing burden of providing notice to the rule
23(b)(3) class would be diminished.1 12 The unfairness generated by
the frequent misapplication of rule 23(b)(2) thus can be avoided by
confining its use to injunctive, rather than back pay, actions, while
108. The change in meaningful remedy was an insufficient reason to the court to dismiss
the suit: "Our conclusion is that a class action for injunctive relief and damages properly
brought under Rule 23(a) and (b)(2) should not be dismissed merely because a subsequent
change in policy by the defendant has eliminated the necessity for future injunctive relief,
leaving only the question of past damages for determination by the court." Id. at 768. See
Pettway v. Americn Cast Iron Pipe Co., 494 F.2d 211, 256-58 (5th Cir. 1974). See also notes
87-91 supra & accompanying text.
109. 3B J. MooRE, supra note 78, 23.45[1], at 23-708.
110. Cf. id. at 23-709.
111. Id.
112. See Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 94 S. Ct. 2140, 2150-52 (1974).
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securing the important safeguards of rule 23(b) (3) certification to all
parties involved. 13
CONCLUSION
Although Title VII may be one of the most significant legislative
attempts to redress the ills of discrimination, its effects may be
limited without a proper procedural vehicle for the delivery of its
benefits. Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure holds much
potential as a device for obtaining the substantive benefits of Title
VII, but its recurrent misuse not only has limited the rule's effec-
tiveness, it also has deterred providing full equitable relief. By per-
mitting unmanageable classes to be certified under the guise of
injunctive suits, many courts have lost themselves in unworkable
mazes of futility.
Careful distinction between class actions primarily for injunctive
relief and those principally for recovery of monetary damages in the
form of back pay is an absolute requirement for the beneficial use
of the class action. Appropriate injunctive and declaratory relief
should not be forced to bear the weight of improperly conceived,
primarily punitive, classwide back pay awards not grounded on ac-
tual injury of complaining parties properly before the court. Preser-
vation of the particular strengths of the different class action proce-
dures can minimize inefficient litigation and avoid needless delay
in dismantling the vestiges of employment discrimination.
113. See generally Technograph Printed Circuits, Ltd. v. Methode Electronics, Inc., 285
F. Supp. 714 (N.D. Ill. 1968). Action under rule 23(b)(3) was maintained against all parties
involved in infringement suits under certain patented processes; other parties, not involved
in such suits, using the patented processes, with respect to whom injunctive and declaratory
relief would he appropriate, were grouped in a second subclass under rule 23(b)(2). Id. at 723-
27.
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